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precedents. In Micallef v. Miehle Co., the Court discarded the patent danger rule in suits for negligent design of machinery, establishing in its place a rule of reasonable care. In so doing, the Court
ended the twenty-six year hegemony of Campo v. Scofield. With its
discussion of People v. Hobson, The Survey continues its recent
expansion into the area of criminal procedure. The Hobson Court
reaffirmed earlier cases holding that when an attorney has entered
the case, a criminal defendant may not waive his right to counsel
unless his attorney is present. This decision largely discredits the
apparent rejection of the Donovan-Arthur rule in People v. Robles.
Several noteworthy lower court decisions are also considered. In
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co., the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that for statute of limitations purposes
under New York's borrowing statute, a warranty cause of action
accrues in the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts to the
issues, rather than necessarily accruing at the place of sale.
In another significant decision, Green v. Bender, the Supreme
Court, Westchester County, held that a Seider-predicated third
party defendant may seek Dole apportionment without subjecting
himself to in personam jurisdiction. Finally, this issue of The
Survey deals with the long-awaited liberalization of the notice of
claim requirements under section 50-e of the General Municipal
Law. This broad amendment to the statute is critically analyzed.
Through our discussion of these and other subjects, we hope to serve
the practitioner by keeping him abreast of significant new developments in New York law.
ARTICLE 2-LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 202: Significant contacts test extended to breach of warranty
claims for purposes of borrowing statute.
Popularly known as the borrowing statute, CPLR 202 provides
that when a cause of action accrues outside the state in favor of a
nonresident plaintiff, its commencement must be timely under both
New York law and the law of the jurisdiction where it "accrued."'
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The test for determining the place of accrual has traditionally been
a rather mechanical one, whereby the court seeks to determine the
place of the wrong and deems the action to have accrued there for
borrowing statute purposes. 2 By contrast, the Court of Appeals, in
the landmark decisions of Auten v. Auten 3 and Babcock v. Jackson,4
rejected a similarly mechanical "place of accrual" test for conflict
of laws purposes, opting instead for a "grouping of contacts" or
"center of gravity" approach to determine which state's substantive
law should be applied.5 Until recently, however, these decisions
have had no effect on the borrowing statute.6 Indeed, the decision
of the Appellate Division, First Department, in Myers v. Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Corp.7 illustrates the continuing vitality of the mechanical approach to the borrowing statute. The Myers court held
that a negligence cause of action accrued in the state where the
injury was sustained by the nonresident plaintiff, while a breach of
warranty action arising from the same occurrence accrued in the
state where the sale was consummated.'
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or
the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where
the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by
the laws of the state shall apply.
Thus, New York is said to "borrow" the statute of limitations of the foreign jurisdiction where
the cause of action accrued.
2 See, e.g., Smalley v. Hutcheon, 296 N.Y. 68, 70 N.E.2d 161 (1946); Apton v. Barclays
Bank, Ltd., 274 App. Div. 935, 83 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't 1948) (mem.), appeal denied, 274
App. Div. 1065, 86 N.Y.S.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1949).
3 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). For divergent views on the
wisdom of Babcock, see Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1212 (1963).
5 These tests reject the older rule that the law of the place of the wrong, lex loci delecti.
should invariably govern the case, and instead apply the law of the jurisdiction with the
greatest interest in the matter. The Auten Court reasoned that these tests will allow "the
forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the outcome of
[the] particular litigation.'" 308 N.Y. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102, quoting Note, Choice of
Law Problems in Direct Actions Against Indemnification Insurers, 3 UTAH L. REv. 490, 49899 (1953). A discussion of the various interests to be weighed in such tests is provided in
Comment, Choice of Law and the New York Borrowing Statute: A Conflict of Rationales, 35
ALB. L. R.v. 754 (1971).

Thus, as was noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964), New
York courts could conceivably find a cause of action to accrue for borrowing statute purposes
in one state, while determining substantive liability under the law of another state. 332 F.2d
at 78.
1 40 App. Div. 2d 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1st Dep't), modifying mem. 69 Misc. 2d 729,
330 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
"In Myers, a Kentucky plaintiff was injured in Kentucky by an exploding tire which had
been purchased by his employer "f.o.b. Buffalo." The first department found the negligence
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Recently, in Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co.,I the Appellate Division, Second Department, ruled that when a breach of
warranty claim by a nonresident plaintiff is joined with a claim in
negligence, the court must first decide whether the action sounds
"essentially" in tort or contract, and the cause of action should then
be deemed to accrue in the jurisdiction which has the most significant contacts with the essential issues.'0 Thus, the panel extended
the more liberal conflicts test to the traditionally more restrictive
domain of the borrowing statute."
The Martin plaintiff was injured in Virginia by a malfunctioning forklift truck. Asserting one cause of action in negligence and
two in breach of warranty, he sued the manufacturer and the sales
distributor, both of which were New York corporations. Following
Myers, the Supreme Court, Queens County, found that while the
negligence claim accrued in Virginia and was barred by the Virginia
statute of limitations,' 2 the warranty claims accrued in New York
and were timely under the longer New York limitation period.'3 The
decision was appealed to the second department.
Justice Titone, writing for four members of the appellate
panel,'4 rejected the "fragmentation" of the complaint and held that
where the breach of warranty and negligence claims arise from the
same transaction, a court should initially determine the "underlying nature of plaintiff's action and then decide which [jurisdiction]
has the primary interest in the matters in dispute."'" In this case,
since plaintiff was essentially seeking damages for personal injuries,
the action was found to be tortious in nature. Thus, the court held
that Virginia had the most significant contacts with the matter
because it was the state of the forklift's consignment and use, as well
as the locus of plaintiff's injury. Had the traditional, mechanical
accrual test been applied, however, the result would have been
identical to that in Myers. Instead the court extended the AutenBabcock conflicts test to the borrowing statute. Consequently, both
claim to have accrued in Kentucky and the breach of warranty claim to have accrued in New
York. 40 App. Div. 2d at 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
52 App. Div. 2d 463, 384 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1976).
Id. at 466, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
"In so doing, the panel acknowledged the conflict with Myers. Id.
12 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (Supp. 1976) provides a two-year statute of limitations in personal injury actions.
'3N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1964) provides a four-year statute of limitations in
breach of warranty actions.
" Acting Presiding Justice Hopkins and Justices Cohalan and Christ joined in the opinion; Justice Damiani dissented without opinion.
i152 App. Div. 2d at 466, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
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the negligence and the breach of warranty claims were found to
accrue in Virginia and were subject to that state's statute of limitations, under which they were time barred.'"
The Court of Appeals has never determined where a third
party's warranty cause of action accrues for the purpose of the borrowing statute. 7 Concededly, there is an appealing logic to the
Myers holding that the time of accrual for the purpose of the statute
of limitations'8 determines the place of accrual for the purpose of the
borrowing statute.'9 In addition, there is little doubt that the mechanical accrual test utilized by the Myers court is the formula
traditionally applied to the borrowing statute.20 Indeed, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although labeling
this approach "rather simplistic," has declared that it continues to
be the law of the New York courts despite the "sophisticated teachings" of Babcock.
,1Virginia case law has held that a breach of warranty claim which seeks recovery for
personal injuries should be governed by the two-year personal injury statute of limitations.
See Campbell v. Colt Indus., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Va. 1972), discussed in 59 VA. L.
REv. 1590, 1613-15 (1973); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969);
Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968).
,1This is perhaps one area in which products liability has outrun choice of law development. The extension of a cause of action based upon breach of warranty to a third party not
in privity on the original contract has posed a new problem. It is problematical to say that a
third party's cause of action accrued in the forum of the sale, since he acquired no right to
sue on the contract until he was injured. Thus, even under the old rule that a cause of action
accrues in "the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable. . . takes place,"
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 377 (1934), the locus of the third party's injury logically
appears to be the place where his cause of action accrues.
'1 At common law, a breach of warranty action accrued at the time of the sale. Allen v.
Todd, 6 Lans. 222 (Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1872). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the breach
occurs when tender of delivery is made. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney 1964).
" The full development of this point is found in the supreme court's opinion in Myers.
See 69 Misc. 2d at 731-32, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 464. The Appellate Division, First Department,
summarily affirmed this portion of the lower court's determination. There is, however, a
problem with the authority used by the supreme court in reaching this result. The court relied
upon a quotation from the opinion of Judge Cardozo in Standard Casing Co. v. California
Casing Co., 233 N.Y. 413, 418, 135 N.E. 834, 835 (1922), which read:
The undertaking was merely that [the goods] would be delivered to the carrier.
The place where that was to be done, as it would be the place of final performance
by the seller if the contract had been kept, must be the place also of default when
performance was refused.
Omitted in Myers was the next sentence: "Market values in California, and not market values
in New York, must, therefore, be the measure of the value of the bargain." Id. (citation
omitted). The Myers court, therefore, apparently reasoned that because the time of the
breach determined the place of the breach for the purpose of measuring damages, it should
also determine the place of the breach for application of the borrowing statute. See 69 Misc.
2d at 731-32, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
1 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
21 Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Moreover, the Martin holding seems too unclear to be a viable
alternative. The court appears to treat plaintiff's complaint as embodying, in effect, one cause of action, rather than consisting of
three independent theories of liability.2 2 By finding this single action
to be "essentially tortious" and applying to it the grouping of contacts test, the court seems to have deprived the two warranty claims
of independent consideration. If this is in fact the approach followed
in Martin, the second department has embarked' on a questionable
course, since the Court of Appeals has consistently recognized the
validity of a separate warranty action in the products liability
area.2
It is submitted, however, that the Martin holding can be supported by a different rationale. Indeed, the Martin panel may actually have intended to find that there was a distinct warranty
action and then to use it as a basis for extending the grouping of
contacts test to the borrowing statute. Such an approach is in accord with the modern trend in conflict of laws thinking. The
Restatement, without distinguishing between tort and contract, has
endorsed application of the law of the state "which . . .has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
."24 In Martin, the interest of Virginia, the site of the forklift's
exclusive use and of plaintiff's injury, was held to outweigh that of
New York, the site of the sale. 2- It is appropriate to conclude, there22

The court stated: "With respect to the essence or underlying nature of this action, we

believe it to be tortious in concept, notwithstanding that two of the three causes of action
are for breach of warranty." 52 App. Div. 2d at 466, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (emphasis added).
23 Since Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973),
discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 611, 616 (1974), and Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975), discussed in
The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 179, 182 (1975), New York has recognized three distinct
theories of liability in products safety cases: negligence, strict products liability, and warranty, both implied and express. The language of the Martin opinion seems to deny the
separate identity of the warranty action in deeming the entirety of plaintiff's claims "essentially tortious." Indeed, it is highly unusual that the tortious nature of a third party's warranty action be emphasized for the purpose of limiting liability. Previously, recognition of the
tortious nature of a warranty claim has been used to extend liability to minor children of the
buyer's family, Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961),
an injured user, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), an injured rescuer, Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d
460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969), and injured bystanders, Ciampichini v. Ring
Bros., Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dep't 1973).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (torts); id. § 188(1) (contracts)
(1971).
21 New York's interest was found to be "dormant and transitory" and limited to the
period during which the forklift was awaiting shipment to Virginia. 52 App. Div. 2d at 467,
384 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
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fore, that the Martin plaintiffs warranty action, like his negligence
claim, accrued in Virginia for borrowing statute purposes.
Notably, such an approach furthers the threefold objective of
the borrowing statute. CPLR 202 was intended to mitigate the effects of section 207, the "tolling statute,"26 prevent forum shopping
by nonresident plaintiffs,2 and provide the shortest possible period
of limitations for resident defendants.2 8 The mechanical Myers holding defeats the latter two of these objectives by allowing a nonresident plaintiff, time barred in the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts to the action, to bring it in New York and avail himself of a longer statute of limitations, even if New York's connection
with the issue is tenuous. 2 A grouping of contacts application would
afford the court a degree of discretion in choice of law, enabling it
to fully effectuate the objectives of the borrowing statute by frustrating a forum shopping plaintiff as well as affording a resident
defendant the benefit of a shorter period of limitations. 0
This conflict between the departments must eventually be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Given the developing trends discussed above, as well as the Court's flexible attitude toward the
kindred doctrine of forum non conveniens,3 1 it is likely that the
25 CPLR 207(1) provides in pertinent part: "If, when a cause of action accrues against a
person, he is without the state, the time within which the action must be commenced shall
be computed from the time he comes into or returns to the state." For a discussion of the
relationship between CPLR 202 and CPLR 207, see 1 WK&M 202.01.
" See George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964); Daigle v. Leavitt, 54 Misc. 2d 651, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1967).
See generally CPLR 202, commentary at 81 (McKinney 1972). See also Ester, Borrowing
Statutes of Limitations and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962).
25 See Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods Co., 277 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Baker v. Cohn, 266 App. Div. 236, 41 N.Y.S.2d
765 (1st Dep't 1943); Daigle v. Leavitt, 54 Misc. 2d 651, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. Rockland
County 1967).
2 See Gegan, Where Does a PersonalInjury Action Accrue Under the New York Borrowing Statute, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 62, 66 (1972).
11The Martin court declared:
In arriving at this conclusion, we also take cognizance of the fact that we are giving
effect to the primary purposes of the "borrowing" statute, which are to prevent
"forum shopping" by nonresident plaintiffs . . . and also to give resident defendants the benefit of the shortest period of limitations ....
52 App. Div. 2d at 468, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (citations omitted).
3' With its decisions in Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 561, 609-12
(1972), codified in CPLR 327, and Martin v. Mieth, 35 N.Y.2d 414, 321 N.E.2d 777, 362
N.Y.S.2d 853 (1974), the Court of Appeals moved towards recognizing that all significant
factors in an individual case should be considered in finding the appropriate forum for the
dispute. Lower courts have interpreted these decisions as encouraging a liberal approach. See,
e.g., Pollack v. Cooley, 175 N.Y.L.J. 61, March 30, 1976, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County); Vath v. Israel, 80 Misc. 2d 759, 364 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975).
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Court will opt for an outright application of the grouping of contacts
test to the borrowing statute. It is to be hoped that the Court's
resolution of this conflict will be free of both the mechanical approach of Myers and the ambiguous reasoning of Martin.
CPLR 214(5): Three-year statute of limitations applied to action
for abuse of process.
Article 2 of the CPLR contains detailed provisioins indicating
the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action
in New York. None of these provisions, however, expressly declares
32
which statute of limitations governs an action for abuse of process.
CPLR 215(3) provides a one-year limitation period for actions based
on the intentional torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation, or invasion of privacy.33 Section
214(5) applies a three-year statute of limitations to any "action to
recover damages for a personal injury except as provided in section
215."13 Finally, CPLR 213(1) requires that actions "for which no
limitation is specifically prescribed by law" be brought within six
years from the accrual of the cause of action.3 5 Recently, in Levine
v. Sherman,36 the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in a case of first
impression, held that although abuse of process is an intentional
tort which would logically fit most neatly among those actions listed
in 215(3), the language of the CPLR mandates application of the
three-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR 214(5)2
" Abuse of process is "the misuse or perversion of regularly issued legal process for a
purpose not justified by the nature of the process." Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 400, 343 N.E.2d 278, 280, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 639 (1975);
accord, Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 373, 7 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1937); Dean v. Kochendorfer,
237 N.Y. 384, 390, 143 N.E. 229, 231 (1924); Carver Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Williams, 47
App. Div. 2d 834, 835, 365 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566 (2d Dep't 1975). For a discussion of the elements
of an action for abuse of process, see note 50 infra.
- CPLR 215(3) states that a one-year limitation period will be applied to
an action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, or a violation of
the right of privacy under section fifty-one of the civil rights law . ...

31

CPLR 214(5).

CPLR 213(1). The "usual application [of CPLR 213(1)] is to actions in which equitable relief is sought." 1 WK&M 213.01 (footnote omitted); see Ford v. Clendenin, 215 N.Y.
10, 16, 109 N.E. 124, 126 (1915) (applies to any and every form of equitable action); Beresovski
v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 423-25 & n.2, 271 N.E.2d 520, 522-23 & n.2, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673,
675-76 & n.2 (1971) (applies to equitable remedy of specific performance).
" 86 Misc. 2d 997, 384 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
17 Id. at 999, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 687. Coincidentally, 10 days after this statute of limitations
issue was decided by the Levine court as one of first impression, the Supreme Court, New
York County, was presented with the same issue in Brecker v. Groosman, 175 N.Y.L.J. 123,
June 25, 1976, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 24, 1976). The Brecker court, after
35

